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I. INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of labor-management relations naturally assumes
two parties: labor and management. Fundamental to both the industrial
* Throughout the Special Project, this piece is cited as Special Project Note, Hybrid
Employees.
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philosophy and labor legislation1 of the United States has been the as-
sumption of mutually exclusive and largely adversarial camps of "em-
ployers" and "employees." This rigid dichotomy, however, fails to
recognize the existence of a third group of workers that fits neither the
labor nor the management typology. These workers are best described
as hybrid employees: workers who arguably deserve many of the statu-
tory protections afforded to labor but who may be aligned too closely
with the employer's interests to warrant the protection of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act or-NLRA).
The primary justification for excluding the hybrid group from the
protections of the Act is a "conflict of interest" rationale. Justice Powell
noted in his partial dissent in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec-
tric Membership Corp.2 that including these hybrid employees, whose
interests are aligned with managements, in a group of rank-and-file em-
ployees necessarily hinders the functioning of the adversarial model of
labor-management relations. Under this adversarial model, the "conflict
of interest" rationale is a persuasive reason for excluding the hybrid
group from the protections of the Act. This rationale, however, loses
some of its persuasiveness upon consideration of a cooperative model of
labor-management relations. The continuing decline in unionization3
and the trend toward greater cooperation between labor and manage-
ment call for a reconsideration of the overall scheme of labor-manage-
ment relations and increased efforts to incorporate the hybrid group
into the system.
Part II of this Special Project Note examines the Act itself in order
to determine which workers are excluded from the statutory definition
of "employee."' Next, Part III examines certain specific groups of hy-
brid employees as they have been defined and treated by the United
States Supreme Court. Part IV discusses possible alternative protec-
tions for employees excluded from the coverage of the Act. Possible
protections include The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and employment-at-
will actions. Part V concludes that United States labor legislation
1. See supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 75-82 and accompa-
nying text.
2. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 193 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "In the adversary system which our labor laws
envision, neither management nor labor should be forced to accept a potential fifth column into its
ranks." Id.
3. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, union membership in the non-
agricultural workforce has declined from a high of 35.5% in 1947 to 18% by 1985. S. LEvrrAN, P.
CARLSON & I. SHAPIRO, PROTECTING AMERIcAN WORKERS 145 (1986) (citing data prepared by United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics).
4. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) [hereinafter NLRA].
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should be modified to accommodate the hybrid employees if labor-man-
agement relations truly are becoming more cooperative than
adversarial.
II. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE": WHO IS COVERED BY THE
ACT?
A. Background
Congress passed the original National Labor Relations Act, the
1935 Wagner Act, with two primary goals in mind: (1) the furtherance
of industrial peace and (2) the equalization of bargaining power be-
tween labor and management.' Underlying this legislation was an as-
sumption that the labor system consisted of two groups whose interests
were diametrically opposed. Section 1 of the 1935 Act reflects the
drafters' concerns over the strife, unrest, and inequality of bargaining
power that seemed to characterize the labor-management relationship
in 1935.7 Although the original Act proscribed only employer unfair la-
bor practices, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, in response to a per-
ception that labor unions were also guilty of abusing their power,
recognized unfair labor practices by labor organizations.' A final state-
ment of policy in section 1 of the 1935 Act emphasized Congress' desire
5. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 1, 1 (1985).
6. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
7. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Act states:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or ob-
structing commerce ...
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate
or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and
the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of com-
petitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce . . . by removing certain recognized sources of in-
dustrial strife and unrest. . . and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employ-
ers and employees.
Id. (changes made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments are italicized).
8. Id.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations,
their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or ob-
structing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes
and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair . . . the
free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the
assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
Id. (changes made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments are italicized.)
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to eliminate the obstructions to commerce caused by the adversarial re-
lationship between employers and employees by encouraging collective
bargaining and protecting the workers' right to organize.'
B. Statutes
A logical starting point for determining who is protected by the Act
is the language of the statute itself. The most important rights in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act are granted to "employees,"' 10 who are defined in sec-
tion 2(3) of the Act.'1 The statutory definition, however, is frustratingly
circular and of little real value in determining who is protected under
the Act. Section 2(3) states, "The term 'employee' shall include any em-
ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise ... -
The statute expressly exempts certain workers from the definition
of employee: agricultural workers, domestic servants, individuals em-
ployed by parents or spouses, independent contractors, supervisors, em-
ployees subject to the Railway Labor Act, and employees of other
persons not employers within the meaning of section 2(2). 1' The ration-
9. Id.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substan-
tial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstruc-
tions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or-
ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.; see supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts.
10. Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) of this title.
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
11. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
12. Id. The full text of § 2(3) reads as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual em-
ployed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status
of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, .. or by any other person who
is not an employer as herein defined.




ale for excluding these workers from the coverage of the Act is their
assumed alignment with management.1"
Related to the provisions exempting certain employees are those
which give the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) the author-
ity to decide which employees should be grouped together for collective
bargaining purposes. 15 A proviso to section 9(b), however, limits the
Board's ability to group certain employees into units with other em-
ployees."6 One such limitation prohibits the Board from declaring ap-
propriate a unit that includes both professional and nonprofessional
employees, unless a majority of the professional employees votes for in-
clusion in the unit.'
7
III. DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE": CASE LAW
A. Managerial Employees
Certain types of workers, though not explicitly excluded from the
coverage of the Act, arguably do not need protection from employers.
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts began differentiat-
ing between these workers and protected employees in bargaining unit
cases. One group of workers not expressly excluded from the statute are
"managerial employees," who were held by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.'8 to be implicitly excluded from the Act's
coverage. This case involved a determination of whether certain
"buyer" employees of Bell Aerospace should be excluded from the Act's
coverage as "managerial employees." The employer asserted that the
buyers were managerial employees and, as such, were excluded auto-
matically from protection under the Act.'9 The NLRB, however, had
certified an election based on its conclusion that the buyers were cov-
ered by the Act.
Because the determination of whether the buyers were "managerial
employees" depended largely on the buyers' job description, the Court
focused its analysis on this description.20 At Bell Aerospace the buyers
could authorize purchases of "routine" items "off the shelf" from a ven-
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). Section 9(b) provides that "[t]he Board shall
decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Professional employees are defined in § 2(12) of the Act. NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. §
152 (1982); see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
18. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
19. Id. at 269.
20. Id. at 270.
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dor. If the requested item was special, the buyer was authorized to draw
up invitations for bids and to decide which vendors to use in matters
involving up to $5000. For amounts above $5000, however, buyers had
to obtain supervisory approval.21
The Court denied enforcement of the Board-certified election,
holding that managerial employees as a class were not protected under
the Act.22 Basing its inquiry on relevant Board and court decisions, as
well as the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the Court
concluded that Congress originally had intended to exclude from the
Act's protection all employees classified as managerial.23 The Court
noted that the Wagner Act did not expressly mention the term "mana-
gerial employee. '2 4 Then the Court traced the Board's development of
the concept of managerial employees through a number of cases involv-
ing the appropriateness of bargaining units. In these cases, the Board
had concluded that managerial employees were not to be included in
units with rank-and-file employees. 5 The Court summarized the
Board's policy on managerial employees as expressed in Ford Motor
Co.: 8
We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers exec-
utive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine and effectuate man-
agement policies. These employees we have considered and still deem to be
"managerial," in that they express and make operative the decisions of
management. 27
Despite the Board's determination that managerial employees were
inappropriate for inclusion in rank-and-file bargaining units, the Court
was concededly less certain whether the Board had intended to exclude
all managerial employees from the protection of the Act.2 8 To resolve
this issue, the Court examined the narrower but analogous category of
"supervisory employees," who had been explicitly excluded from the
protections of the Act by Congress in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments.29 This legislative exclusion of supervisors was a direct response
21. Id.
22. Id. at 289. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the buyers were "managerial em-
ployees," but remanded that issue to the Board "to apply the proper legal standard in determining
the status of these buyers." Id. at 289-90 (footnote omitted).
23. Id. at 274-75.
24. Id. at 275.
25. Id. at 275.
26. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 17 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 394 (1946).
27. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 276 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 322, 17
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 395).
28. Id. at 276.
29. Section 2(3) of the NLRA, as amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, states in part:
"The term 'employee' . shall not include ... any individual employed as a supervisor. .
NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
[Vol. 41:601
LABOR-MANAGEMENT
to the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision in Packard Motor Car Co.
v. NLRB, 0 in which the Court had upheld a Board decision that super-
visors, specifically foremen, were "employees" within the meaning and
protection of the Act."'
Because the Packard decision was nullified by the 1947 Taft-Hart-
ley Amendments, the Court in Bell Aerospace focused on Justice Doug-
las' dissent in Packard as the correct statement of national labor policy.
Justice Douglas had argued that if foremen are employees within the
Act, so are vice presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintend-
ents, and even presidents, all of whom are on the payroll and are com-
monly referred to as "management. 3 2 Justice Douglas also had noted
that the Act was intended to protect laborers and workers, whose rights
to organize and bargain collectively had not been recognized by indus-
try. Foremen, managers, and vice presidents, Justice Douglas explained,
had endured no similar history of oppression." This historical lack of
oppression suggested that managerial employees warranted the protec-
tions of the Act no more than the supervisory employees who had been
specifically excluded under Taft-Hartley.
Finally, the Court in Bell Aerospace summarized the legislative
history of Taft-Hartley. Although both the House and Senate had
agreed that certain persons-including workers in "labor relations, per-
sonnel and employment departments," and "confidential employ-
ees" 34 -were plainly outside the coverage of the Act, the two houses
disagreed on the necessity of making these exclusions from the statute
explicit. The House wanted specifically to exclude these workers from
the coverage of the legislation. In the conference committee, however,
House and Senate representatives agreed that a specific exclusion was
unnecessary because the Board had long considered these persons to be
The term "supervisor" was defined by the Taft-Hartley Amendments in § 2(11):
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or disci-
pline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982) (changes made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amend-
ment are italicized).
30. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
31. 330 U.S. at 490-91.
32. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 278 (quoting Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 494-95
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
33. Id. at 279 (citing Packard Motor Car, 485 U.S. at 496-97 (Douglas, J. dissenting));
see supra note 1.
34. Id. at 283.
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excluded from the Act.35 The Court, reasoning that this list of excluded
workers did not exhaust the entire universe of impliedly excluded per-
sons, held that the drafters of Taft-Hartley considered some additional
employees to be so high in the management structure as to be impliedly
excluded. 6
B. Confidential Employees
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.
37
the Supreme Court considered whether "confidential" employees
should be excluded from the coverage of the Act. Hendricks County
involved the discharge of Mary Weatherman, the personal secretary to
the general manager and chief executive officer of a rural electric mem-
bership cooperative. Weatherman was dismissed several days after she
signed a petition seeking the reinstatement of a friend and fellow em-
ployee who had lost his arm in a work-related accident. 8 After her dis-
missal, Weatherman filed with the NLRB an unfair labor practice
charge against her employer, alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. 9 Part of the company's defense was that Weatherman, as a
"confidential" secretary, was impliedly excluded from the Act's defini-
tion of employee under section 2(3) and was, therefore, not entitled to
the Act's protection.40 The administrative law judge rejected the com-
pany's argument, explaining that the Board's decisions on confidential
employees had excluded only those employees who, in a confidential ca-
pacity, help to formulate and effectuate management policies regarding
35. Id.
36. Id. To support this conclusion, the Court cited a House Report discussion of confi-
dential employees which acknowledged that "[m]ost of the people who would qualify as 'con-
fidential' employees are executives and are excluded from the act in any event." (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs AcT, 1947, at 292, 314 (1985) (emphasis added)).
37. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title." NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 7
states the rights of employees under the Act as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (changes made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments are
italicized).




labor relations.4 This test, known as the "labor nexus" test, embodies
the Board's practice of excluding from protected status only those "con-
fidential employees" whose duties include participation in labor related
matters.42 The administrative law judge's application of the test found
that Weatherman was not a confidential employee with such a "labor
nexus," and the Board affirmed this finding.4
Relying on language in a footnote in Bell Aerospace, however, the
Seventh Circuit held that all confidential secretaries should be excluded
from the Act, regardless of a labor nexus.44 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the Board's long standing practice of excluding
only those confidential employees who satisfied the Board's "labor
nexus" test had a reasonable basis in law.45 The Supreme Court found
that the Court of Appeals had erred in overruling the Board's determi-
nation that Weatherman lacked the sufficient labor nexus to be ex-
cluded as a confidential employee."
Justice Powell's partial dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that the majority, in refusing
to exclude the personal secretary from the Act's coverage as a "confi-
dential" employee, reached a result contrary to a primary purpose of
the Act: to hold firm the division between management and labor.47 The
partial dissent further argued that the extension of the Act's coverage
to confidential secretaries, who are clearly aligned with management
and privy to confidential management information, may subject these
41. See Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 1978 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH)
1 19,623.
42. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 176.
43. Id. at 173.
44. 603 F.2d 25, 30 (1979) (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 n.12
(1974)).
45. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 190.
46. Id. at 191.
47. Justice Powell stated:
[W]hen the Board in Bell Aerospace departed from its own recognition that "[i]t was the
clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all individuals allied with
management," this Court responded by again requiring the Board to adhere to the dividing
line between management and labor-a line fundamental to the industrial philosophy of the
labor laws in this country.
Indeed, it was to assure that those employees allied with management were not included
in the ranks of labor that the Board originally developed the "supervisory," "managerial,"
and "confidential" employees exclusions from the Wagner Act. The Board recognized that
employees who by their duties, knowledge, or sympathy were aligned with management
should not be treated as members of labor. In the adversary system which our labor laws
envision, neither management nor labor should be forced to accept a potential fifth column
into its ranks.
Id. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted, emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting In re Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956) (emphasis added)).
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employees to intense conflicts of loyalty.48
C. Professional Employees Under the Yeshiva Rationale
The most significant recent case to address the issue of employees
found to be outside the coverage of the Act is NLRB v. Yeshiva Univer-
sity.49 In Yeshiva the Supreme Court considered whether university
faculty members should be defined inside or outside the coverage of the
Act. The Board had reasoned that faculty members were "professional"
employees within the meaning of section 2(12),50 but had not decided
whether these professional employees were denied coverage under the
express exclusion of supervisors or the implied exclusion of managerial
employees.51 The Court explained that both exemptions arise from the
single principle that "the employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty
of its representatives. ' 52 The Yeshiva Court defined managerial em-
ployees as those who "formulate and effectuate management policies by
expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer. '53 The
Court also stated that managerial employees must, of necessity, be al-
igned with management. 4 In general, explained the Court, an employee
is excluded as managerial only if he exercises discretion in a manner
that controls or implements the policies of the employer.55
The Board had argued that the status of employees must be deter-
mined by reference to the "alignment with management" criterion.5
Based on this criterion, the Board had concluded that the faculty em-
ployees were not aligned with management because they were expected
to use "independent professional judgment." 5 In its previous faculty
decisions, the Board had developed three presumptions: first, that
faculty authority was collective;58 second, that a faculty exercised au-
thority in its own interests rather than the university's interest;59 and
third, that final authority rested with the board of trustees rather than
the faculty.60
By a margin of five to four, however, the Supreme Court held the
48. Id. at 200.
49. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
50. Id. at 678; see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id. at 682.
53. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron Co., 416 U.S. 267, 281-82
(1973)).
54. Id. at 683.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 684.
57. Id.





Yeshiva University faculty to be managerial employees and not covered
by the Act.8 1 One of the majority's stated reasons for excluding the
faculty from the Act's coverage was a desire to preclude divided loyal-
ties among the faculty. The controlling consideration in the majority's
view, however, was that the Yeshiva University faculty was exercising
authority that in any other context would be managerial.62 Such mana-
gerial authority, the majority argued, was evident from a consideration
of the "industrial analogy":'6 the Yeshiva faculty determined "the prod-
uct to be produced, the terms on which it [would] be offered, and the
customers who [would] be served. '64
In dissent, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun ar-
gued that the Yeshiva faculty could not be deemed managerial because
the faculty was not accountable to the administration. 5 The dissent
further argued that the majority's suggestion that a university faculty's
role is one of undivided loyalty to management is completely contrary
to the concept of academic freedom.66 Faculty members, urged the dis-
sent, generally are not accountable to the administration for exercising
their "faculty governance functions."6 The dissent concluded that the
Court's decision effectively removed the administration's incentive to
resolve disputes with the faculty through discussion and mutual
agreement.68
D. Implications of Yeshiva
1. Limitation to the Faculty Context?
Although the majority attempted to limit its holding, some com-
mentators have suggested that Yeshiva's reasoning could apply to cases
in which the distinction between manager and worker is not clear or to
cases in which the employees, through an employee stock option plan or
some other device, participate in the ownership of the business.69 While
the applicability of the Yeshiva rationale to such cases is still uncertain,
both faculty and nonfaculty cases do acknowledge that Yeshiva sup-
plies the leading definition of managerial status.7 0
61. Id. at 679.
62. Id. at 686.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66, Id. at 700.
67. Id. (quoting In re Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 257, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1862,
1874 (1975) (Kennedy, Board Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted)).
68. Id. at 705.
69. Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Coopera-
tion, 37 LAB. L.J. 595, 603 (1986).
70. Boston Univ. Chapter v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Cooper
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Although several recent cases, based on a rigid application of
Yeshiva, have denied faculty employees protection,7 1 other faculty cases
have suggested the limited applicability of Yeshiva by distinguishing
the case and finding that the faculty members concerned were not man-
agerial employees under the Act. 2 In Loretto Heights College the
Tenth Circuit held that although the faculty members assisted in for-
mulating and implementing management policy, the faculty members
were not managerial employees because their participation in manage-
ment policymaking did not constitute "effective recommendation or
control. '73 The court's analysis of the faculty's role in management pol-
icy revealed that the major faculty committee responsible for participa-
tion in governance of the college made recommendations to committees
or administrators and shared in the decisionmaking process in matters
such as the college's philosophy, objectives, curriculum, admission,
graduation, and academic calendar.7 4 Despite this authority held by the
faculty and the similarities to the facts of Yeshiva, the Tenth Circuit
held that the faculty members were not managerial employees." These
faculty members, the court explained, were not like the faculty in
Yeshiva, who had absolute academic authority. In Loretto Heights Col-
lege the administration, not the faculty, retained control of
policymaking. 0
2. Impact on Other Professionals
Yeshiva's consideration of the professional employee raises the is-
sue of professional employees' status under the Act. Section 9(b)(1)
provides that the Board may not group professional and nonprofes-
sional employees into the same bargaining unit unless a majority of the
professional employees votes for inclusion in the unit. ' Section 2(12) of
Union for Advancement of Science, 783 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d
616, 621 (7th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 760 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1985);
NLRB v. Escambia River Elec. Coop., Inc., 733 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir. 1984); Walla Walla Union
Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th Cir. 19 0).
71. See Boston Univ. Chapter, 835 F.2d at 401-02; Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d at 628; Livingston
College, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1332 (1987) (LEXIS, Labor library, Cases
file).
72. Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1984); Cooper Union for Ad-
vancement of Science, 783 F.2d at 31-32.
73. 742 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683 n.17).
74. Id. at 1249.
75. Id. at 1256.
76. Id. at 1255.
77. NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1982). Section 9(b)(1) reads, in pertinent part:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest free-
dom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof:
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the Act defines "professional employee" by reference to the essential
requisites of professional status. A professional employee is one whose
work either (A) (1) is predominantly varied and intellectual; (2) consist-
ently requires the exercise of discretion or judgment; (3) cannot be
standardized in terms of time and output; and (4) requires study in a
specialized discipline ordinarily taught in a university or hospital; or
(B) is done in preparation for a professional career, under another pro-
fessional person, by one who has completed study in a specialized disci-
pline ordinarily taught in a university or hospital. 8 Under the Yeshiva
rationale, professional employees may be excluded from the coverage of
the Act if their duties constitute managerial activities.79
Some commentators argue that Yeshiva has had a wide ranging im-
pact on the ability of many private professionals to organize. s° One
group contends that Yeshiva virtually has stifled union organization in
private institutions.8 1 One example of Yeshiva's influence on other pro-
fessionals is the Board's decision in NLRB v. FHP, Inc.,8 2 in which full-
time physicians and dentists employed by a health maintenance organi-
zation served on various employer committees.8 3 The Board concluded,
based on the Yeshiva rationale, that the doctors who actively partici-
pated in management of their facilities by serving on the employer com-
mittees were not entitled to organize under the Act.' The Board in
FHP, Inc. also noted the fine line separating mere professional employ-
Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes
if such unit includes both professional employees unless a majority of such professional em-
ployees vote for inclusion in such unit .
Id.
78. NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982).
79. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 69, at 604.
81. Id. (citing Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 21, 1986, No. 35, at A-3 (statement of the Na-
tional Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions)
(LEXIS, Labor library, DLABRT file)).
82. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,229 (Mar. 27, 1985), 118 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1525 (1985).
83. Id. at 1526-27. These committees included a Peer Review Committee, Physician and
Therapeutics Committee, Advisory Committee on Provider Work Environment, Emergency Ser-
vices Committee, Patient Services Committee, and Advisory Committee to the Board of Directors.
84. The Board stated:
We find . . . that the full-time staff physicians and dentists at FHP, like the faculty of
Yeshiva University, possess and exercise authority to formulate and effectuate management
policies. ..
* * * [W]e conclude that the committees perform managerial functions within the mean-
ing of the Yeshiva decision..
- ' * We therefore find that [the full-time staff physicians and dentists] are excluded from
coverage under the Act as managerial employees.
Id. at 1527-28.
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ees from professionals whose work includes managerial activities. s5
Some observers have argued that barring professionals from union
membership eliminates from participation the individuals who are best
suited to help the cause of labor-management cooperation."6 These
commentators argue that professionals with experience in structuring
shared decisionmaking relationships that "blur the distinction between
employer and employee" are potentially some of the most effective ad-
vocates of employee causes."7
3. Broader Implications for Labor-Management Relations
A broader criticism of Yeshiva is that the decision impedes prob-
lem solving by discouraging cooperative relations between management
and employees."8 Many employees will avoid participation in coopera-
tive ventures with management if the cost of cooperation is exclusion
from union membership and loss of protection under the Act."9 To the
extent that Yeshiva establishes the wrong incentives, it is legitimate
progeny of United States statutory labor laws, which were written at a
time when labor-management relations were assumed to be largely ad-
versarial.90 To the extent that the trend in labor-management relations
is toward cooperation and away from antagonism, Congress should con-
sider amending United States labor laws to reflect this shifting
orientation.
IV. ALTERNATE FORMS OF PROTECTION FOR EXCLUDED EMPLOYEES
Because certain employees are not protected by the Act, they must
look elsewhere for protection from employer abuses. Most of the protec-
tion available to these employees is provided in statutes independent of
the National Labor Relations Act, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) 91 and Title VIP2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. These statutes provide protection for employees excluded from
the Act's coverage if the claim falls within the statute's protective
scope. The judicially created exceptions to the employment-at-will doc-
85. "As professional employees, staff physicians may also be managerial if their activities on
behalf of their employer fall outside the scope of decision-making routinely performed by similarly
situated health care professionals and that is primarily incident to treatment of their patients." Id.
at 1527 (footnote omitted).




90. See Hendricks Rural County Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 192-93 (1981) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); supra note 1.
91. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
614 [Vol. 41:601
LABOR-MANAGEMENT
trine are another potential source of protection. Despite substantial
scholarly attention paid to the ADEA, Title VII, and the exceptions to
employment-at-will, little has been written about these sources as alter-
native actions for employees excluded from bringing suit under the Act.
This Special Project Note presents merely an overview of these plaintiff
actions as alternatives available to an employee who is excluded from
the coverage of the Act. Moreover, the discussion of possible alternative
protections is by no means exhaustive. Rather, the analysis is intended
to illustrate some of the more obvious and important alternative
protections.
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
One protective statute on which an excluded employee might rely
is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. During recent years, the
number of ADEA lawsuits has increased dramatically."3 Many of these
ADEA actions are brought by persons likely to be defined outside the
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act.94 The ADEA was enacted
in 1967 in response to a congressionally requested study, which stated
that the essential purpose of the ADEA was to "promote employment
of older persons based on their ability" and "to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment.
'95
The ADEA, which protects employees over age forty,9" prohibits an
employer from discriminating on the basis of age in hiring, wages, dis-
charge, advertisements, classification, benefits, seniority, and all addi-
tional terms and conditions of employment.97 The ADEA's prohibition
against arbitrary age discrimination is enforced by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) through a provision that incor-
porates certain remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).2s The remedies available under the ADEA have a "restorative
purpose":99 to place the party in the position he would have been in had
the discrimination not occurred.100 The remedies available under the
93. 19 EEOC ANN. REP. 17-18 (1984); Stillman & Jepson, Compliance with the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act: Special Problems, 64 Cm. B. REC. 284, 284 (1983).
94. See Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 289-90.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
96. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (Supp. 1987). The statute was amended in 1986 to remove language
denying the protection of the Act to persons over age 70. Prior to 1986 the statute protected only
persons "at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age." See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982).
98. Id. § 626(a)-(b); see id. §§ 211(b), 216 & 217 (1982); see also Marion, Legal and Equita-
ble Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REv. 298, 300-01
(1986).
99. Marion, supra note 98, at 298.
100. Id. (citing Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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ADEA are recovery of back pay, employment reinstatement, promotion,
injunctive relief, compulsory hiring, and, for willful violations, liqui-
dated damages. 101 Through incorporating by reference the FLSA reme-
dial provisions, the statute also allows for recovery of attorney's fees
and court costs. 102 The potential protections affordedto executive em-
ployees by the ADEA are, however, restricted by the so-called "execu-
tive exemption."' 03
In proving a violation of the ADEA, a plaintiff may put on direct
evidence of age discrimination. The general nature of ADEA claims and
the employer's typical control over employment records and the person-
nel in charge of making employment decisions, however, make the
availability of direct evidence of discrimination rare.104 When direct evi-
dence is not available, an ADEA plaintiff may prove a violation of the
statute under either of two judicially created schemes of presumptions
and inferences-the disparate treatment theory or the disparate impact
theory. 0 5
The initial showing that an ADEA plaintiff must make to establish
a prima facie case under the disparate treatment theory is actually an
adaptation of a test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,0 6 a Title VII case involving race discrimination. 0 7 Under the
McDonnell Douglas formula, as modified in the ADEA case of Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 08 a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he is a member of the
protected age group; (2) that he was performing his job at a level that
met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that he was fired; and
(4) that the employer sought someone else to perform the same work
after the plaintiff left. 0 9 Under the modified McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard, the plaintiff always maintains the burden of persuasion. 10 After
the plaintiff meets the initial burden of production, however, that bur-
101. Id. § 626(b).
102. Id.; see id. § 216(b).
103. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(1) (Supp. 1987). See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d
724 (2d Cir. 1984) (construing the "executive exemption"); Note, ADEA Executive Exemption
Plaintiffs as Paradigm Candidates for Front Pay, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1985). Under the
exemption, persons "employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position" may still
be retired at age 65 solely on the basis of age if certain other conditions are met. The most impor-
tant of these conditions is entitlement of the executive employee to an "immediate nonforfeitable
annual retirement benefit" which in the aggregate equals at least $44,000. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(1)
(Supp. 1987).
104. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Propos-
als for Change, 73 VA. L. REv. 601, 610 (1987).
105. Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 285.
106. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
107. See Note, supra note 104, at 610.
108. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 1013-14; see Note, supra note 104, at 612-13.
110. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1011-12.
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den shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment decision in issue."' At this stage, the em-
ployer's burden of production does not require him to prove his expla-
nation for the employment decision. 11 2 The employer meets his burden
of production if his proffered reason creates a question of fact as to
whether the employer discriminated against the employee." 3
After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of age discrimination
and the defendant counters with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the alleged discriminatory action, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's stated
reason was merely a pretext for the discrimination." 4 Because employ-
ment decisions can be based on various criteria and motives, the courts
have not required an ADEA plaintiff to prove that age discrimination
was the sole reason for the employer's action."' Instead, the plaintiff
has been required to prove only that age was a "determining factor" in
the employer's alleged discriminatory action.11 6 Although the "deter-
mining factor" test has been articulated in different forms by the
courts, the differing definitions have essentially the same meaning:
whether the factor was one "that made a difference. 1" 7
Under the disparate impact theory, the plaintiff attempts to prove
a violation of the ADEA by demonstrating that a practice or policy of
the employer has had a disparate impact on persons within the pro-
tected employee class." 8 This showing typically is made by the use of
statistics.1 9 Disparate impact cases arise less frequently than disparate
treatment cases, and for several years the courts were reluctant to rec-
ognize disparate impact fact patterns. 20 In Geller v. Markham,'2' how-
ever, a federal district court acknowledged that the distinction between
disparate treatment and disparate impact exists just as clearly in age
111. Id. at 1011 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
112. Note, supra note 104, at 611 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)).
113. Note, supra note 104, at 614 (citing Archambault v. United Computing Sys., Inc., 786
F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986)).
114. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1011-14.
115. Id. at 1019; Note, supra note 104, at 614.
116. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1019; Note, supra note 104, at 614-15.
117. Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 179 (10th Cir. 1986). For a list of various
formulations of the "determining factor" standard, see Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 858 n.23
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
118. Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 287.
119. Harper, Statistics as Evidence of Age Discrimination, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1347
(1981).
120. Id. at 1359 (citing Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va.
1977)).
121. 481 F. Supp. 835 (D. Conn. 1979).
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122discrimination cases as in Title VII race and sex discrimination cases.
The Geller court concluded that the employer's "neutral" practice cre-
ated a disparate impact that made the practice unlawful. '
An employer faced with an ADEA charge generally can respond
with one of two types of defenses. First, the employer can deny that age
was a factor in the challenged action.1 4 Second, the employer can admit
that age was a determining factor, but can claim an overriding justifica-
tion for the action. 2 5 Under the first type of defense, the employer can
claim that the employee was discharged for "good cause ' M or because
of "reasonable factors other than age."'127 Under the second type of de-
fense, an employer is entitled to consider age whenever age is a "bona
fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) necessary in the employer's op-
erations.12s Employers have faced difficulties in proving age as a BFOQ,
and courts generally have restricted proof to cases in which the physical
qualifications of employees have been closely related to public safety. 129
One other option available to the employer is to prove that, in pursuing
its alleged discriminatory actions, the employer was observing the terms
of a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit plan that was not
simply a pretext to avoid its ADEA obligation. 3 '
Some data suggests that ADEA plaintiffs are likely to be the same
type of employees excluded from the protection of the Act as managers
or supervisory employees. Former EEOC Vice Chairman Cathie Shat-
tuck conducted surveys of plaintiffs seeking relief under the ADEA be-
tween 1978 and 1983." This data produced the following profile of the
average ADEA plaintiff: a fifty-five year old white male, with twenty
years employment service, and earning $32,000 per year in a white col-
lar position before being terminated by his employer.13 2 Other observ-
ers, based on their experience with ADEA litigation,' have suggested a
122. Id. at 837.
123. Id. at 839.
124. See Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 287.
125. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1982).
127. Id. § 623(f)(1).
128. Id.
129. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 418-20 (1985); Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976); see Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 287-88.
130. Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 288.
131. Higher Paid White Men File the Most Age Discrimination Actions, EEOC Finds, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 228, at A-10 (Nov. 26, 1982) (LEXIS, Labor library, DLABRT file) [herein-
after Age Discrimination]; Recipients of ADEA Settlements Are Mostly Long-Term, Male Em-
ployees, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at A-3 (Jan. 12, 1984) (LEXIS Labor library, DLABRT
file).
132. Age Discrimination, supra note 131, at A-10.
133. Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 289.
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similar profile, which describes the typical ADEA plaintiff as a salaried,
nonunion member of management, possible executive, supervisor, staff
professional, or skilled worker." These ADEA plaintiffs, who possess
above average educations and are members of the middle to upper-mid-
dle class, are typically long-term employees whose services have become
less valuable over time. 13 5 This experience-based ADEA plaintiff profile
also matches the profile of many upper level management or supervi-
sory employees defined outside the Act. Both profiles suggest that the
ADEA may serve as an important alternative remedy to supervisory,
managerial, confidential, or professional employees who find themselves
excluded from the Act's coverage.
B. Title VII
Another potential source of protection for employees excluded from
the coverage of the Act is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 137 As with the ADEA, the agency
charged with enforcement of Title VII is the EEOC. 38 The proscrip-
tions of Title VII apply to certain classes of persons defined in the stat-
ute. Persons or organizations subject to the proscriptions of Title VII
include employers,3 9 employment agencies, 40 labor organizations,'
and "joint labor-management committee[s] controlling apprenticeship
or other training or retraining. "142 The relatively precise definitions of
these terms eliminate some of the interpretive problems that character-
ize other aspects of Title VII.
143
The two basic definitions of employment discrimination that have
evolved under Title VII are disparate treatment and disparate or ad-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
137. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1982) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
138. Id. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5.
139. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
140. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
141. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
142. Id. § 2000e-2(d).




verse impact."" Disparate treatment analysis focuses on an employer's
motivation for treating a worker or job applicant less favorably than
another worker. Disparate impact analysis, on the other hand, focuses
on the effect of an employer's employment decisions. 145
1. Disparate Treatment
According to the statutory language of Title VII, relief is available
only if the employer's discriminatory practices are intentional. 4  Be-
cause the term "intentional" is not defined in the statute, 47 courts in-
terpreting Title VII have been faced with determining the degree of
employer motivation necessary to establish a violation. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green 48 the Supreme Court established a framework
for resolving the issue of the employer's motivation. Under the McDon-
nell Douglas test, a plaintiff meets the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of disparate treatment by showing: (1) that he is a member of
a protected class; (2) that he has applied for and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected
by the employer; and (4) that after his rejection the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons possessing qualifications similar to
those of the complainant.
49
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer bears
the burden of showing a legitimate reason for rejecting the employee. 150
If the employer articulates a legitimate reason, then the plaintiff must
have an opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's purported rea-
son for rejecting the plaintiff was a mere pretext. 5 ' A final defense for
the employer in a disparate treatment case is to show that the chal-
lenged practice was justified by business necessity.1
52
2. Disparate (Adverse) Impact
One writer recently has stated that the disparate impact theory is
the most important judicial contribution to Title VII. 3 In contrast to
144. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on Theory, Problems, and the Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 429, 431 (1985).
145. Id.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
147. Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and
Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 241 (1976).
148. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
149. Id. at 802.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 804.
152. See Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 509 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 1975).
153. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimina-
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disparate treatment analysis, in disparate or adverse impact analysis
the employer's intent is irrelevant. Only the effect matters in adverse
impact discrimination. 154 Even if an employer utilizes employment deci-
sion criteria that are racially neutral on their face, the criteria have an
impermissible adverse impact if they disfavor proportionally more qual-
ified blacks than whites and are not mandated by business necessity.
155
The seminal adverse impact case is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,156 in
which the Supreme Court extended Title VII's coverage to facially neu-
tral employment practices that have adverse impacts on persons of a
given race, sex, religion, or national origin.15 1 Under the Griggs analysis,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of ad-
verse impact. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the validity of
the employment criteria is irrelevant. If, however, the plaintiff demon-
strates sufficient adverse impact, the burden shifts to the employer to
justify the employment practice by showing that the practice is either
job-related or mandated by business necessity. 158 If the defendant suc-
ceeds in carrying its burden, the plaintiff has an opportunity to rebut
the defendant's evidence by proving that the alleged justification is a
pretext or by showing the existence of alternative selection devices or
criteria that have comparable utility but could have a less adverse im-
pact than the criteria in question.1
59
3. Title VII Versus ADEA
Title VII discrimination differs in several respects from age dis-
crimination, which is proscribed under the ADEA. The sociological dif-
ferences in discrimination based on sex, race, religion, and national
origin compared to age discrimination suggest that the typical Title VII
plaintiff differs from the typical ADEA plaintiff.6 0 For example, aging
is universal; sex and race, on the other hand, are specific and immutable
tion, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1987).
154. Gold, supra note 144, at 431.
155. Id.
156. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
157. Id. at 429-33; see Rutherglen, supra note 153, at 1297.
158. See Gold, supra note 144, at 432-33 (footnotes omitted) (quoting B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 91-92 (2d ed. 1983); Rutherglen, supra note 153, at 1297.
159. See Gold, supra note 144, at 432; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32; see also Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Because the complexity and indirectness of the
methods used to prove employment discrimination have paralleled the typically subtle and indi-
rect character of employment discrimination itself, the courts in Title VII discrimination cases
often are required to analyze statistics, patterns, and general employer policies. See Belton, supra
note 147, at 249. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R RICHARDS, supra note 143, §§ 1.4(c),
1.5(c), 1.8.
160. See Stillman & Jepson, supra note 93, at 288-89.
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characteristics.161 Thus, white male executives are subject to aging and
to age discrimination, but are not likely to be subject to sex or race
discrimination. Given that Title VII plaintiffs often are drawn from mi-
norities and disadvantaged groups, Title VII plaintiffs are not likely to
be managerial or supervisory employees excluded from the coverage of
the Act. Although a profile of the typical Title VII plaintiff apparently
is not available,6 2 some statistics indirectly suggest that Title VII
plaintiffs are less likely than ADEA plaintiffs to be the kind of employ-
ees excluded from the Act.16 In short, the differences between potential
ADEA plaintiffs and potential Title VII plaintiffs indicate that ADEA
plaintiffs are more likely than Title VII plaintiffs to be managerial or
supervisory employees excluded from the coverage of the Act.
C. Employment-at- Will
One other potential source of protection for employees excluded
from the coverage of the Act is a wrongful discharge action premised on
exceptions to the employment-at-wil doctrine. Employment-at-will and
wrongful discharge are actually flipsides of the same coin: wrongful dis-
charge represents the employee's perspective and employment-at-wil
represents the employer's perspective.6 4 Employment-at-will is an an-
cient common law doctrine which holds that an employer can discharge
an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. This employer pre-
rogative traditionally has been described in the case law as the ability
to fire an employee for "good cause, for no cause or even for cause mor-
ally wrong.'
65
Employees under the protection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment are protected from arbitrary discharge by contractual grievance
requirements which provide that discharges occur only for "just cause."
161. See id. at 288.
162. After an exhaustive search the Author was unable to find a Title VII plaintiff profile
similar to Ms. Shattuck's profile of the ADEA plaintiff. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying
text.
163. See, e.g., 19 EEOC ANN. REP. 20 (1984). The vast majority of issues raised in charges
filed under Title VII with the EEOC are race and sex discrimination issues, see id., indicating that
a large percentage of persons seeking relief under Title VII are either women or racial minorities,
neither of whom are well-represented in the ranks of supervisors, managers, or professional em-
ployees likely to be excluded from the coverage of the Act.
From 1981 to 1983 the average monetary benefit under Title VII charges processed by the
EEOC was $4329 per person, as opposed to an average of $9670 per person under the ADEA. 18
EEOC ANN. REP. 13 (1983); 17 EEOC ANN. RaP. 7 (1982). The significantly higher recovery under
the ADEA suggests that persons filing charges under the ADEA are higher salaried, longer term
employees than their Title VII counterparts.
164. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:1.
165. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), reu'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (Tenn. 1915).
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Under the common law doctrine, however, employees outside the cover-
age of both a collective bargaining agreement and the Act essentially
are employed "at the will" of their employer.16 Absent a statutory or
judicially created proscription, the employment-at-will doctrine remains
in force.1 67 Congress, the courts, and state legislatures, however, in re-
cent years have narrowed the scope of the doctrine. Statutes such as the
ADEA, Title VII, and OSHA all restrict the ability of an employer to
discharge employees at will." 8 For example, the ADEA and Title VH
remove the right of the employer to fire employees based on age, race,
or sex.169 Approximately thirty states now have judicially created excep-
tions to employment-at-will. 70 The law of wrongful discharge has de-
veloped from these exceptions.'
The employment-at-will doctrine has three commonly advanced ex-
ceptions: the public policy exception, the implied contract exception,
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception. 72
The public policy exception contends that a discharge is improper if it
violates fundamental public policy. Nearly thirty states have recognized
some form of public policy exception. 73 The primary rationale for this
exception is that the state should prohibit an employer from discharg-
ing an employee because the employee took action that the state desires
to promote. 7 4 States have recognized a public policy exception in cases
of three basic types: (1) cases in which the employee's dismissal was
based on a refusal to commit an illegal or wrongful act;175 (2) cases in
which an employee was discharged for performance of a public duty,
including the "whistleblower" cases;176 and (3) cases in which an em-
ployee was dismissed for exercising a legal right or privilege. 77
The second exception to employment-at-will deems a discharge to
be unlawful if prohibited by the existence of an implied contract. A
166. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:1.
167. Murphy, Employment-At-Will: Judicial Counterpoint to Labor Legislation, 15 STET-
SON L. RE v. 69, 70 (1985).
168. See id. at 69-70.
169. See supra notes 93-161 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May Discharge At-
Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982); Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrong-
ful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 6 n.30 (1984).
171. See generally Annotation, supra note 170, at 544; Lopatka, supra note 170, at 1.
172. See Murphy, supra note 167, at 70; Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HAv. L. REv. 1931, 1934 (1983).
173. See Murphy, supra note 167, at 70.
174. Id.
175. Lopatka, supra note 170, at 7; see, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters
Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
176. Lopatka, supra note 170, at 8.
177. Id, at 11. Each of these three types, see id. at 7-12, is fraught with difficult issues be-
yond the scope of this Special Project Note.
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frequent basis for implied contracts are employee handbooks or manu-
als. Some courts have stated that if an employer's language or actions
encourage reliance on handbooks or manuals and the employer fails to
issue an express disclaimer that these materials do not constitute im-
plied contracts, then the employer is bound to the terms of the hand-
book or manual. 178
The third exception to employment-at-will invalidates discharges
that breach a covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed by law on
all contracts. Under this broad exception, courts probe the employer's
motive for discharge to determine whether the motive is suspect.17 9 One
commentator has noted that the number of cases imposing wrongful
discharge liability based on this theory are increasing.'
One way to understand the significance of the emerging exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine is to examine the potential number
of employees who would receive new legal protection from these excep-
tions. Estimates show that over half of the nonagricultural work force is
not protected by either a collective bargaining agreement or civil service
laws.18' Moreover, the annual number of at-will employees unjustly ter-
minated has been estimated to be between 50,000 and 200,000.182 Fi-
nally, the particular utility of the exceptions to employees excluded
from the Act's coverage is demonstrated by one commentator's observa-
tion that the exceptions are much more likely to support a cause of
action by a dismissed executive or managerial employee than by hourly
workers or lower salaried employees.' 8 This observation is consistent
with the belief that managerial workers rely on the protection of these
exceptions to a greater extent than common workers."8
V. CONCLUSION
The problems faced by the hybrid group of employees excluded
from the coverage of the Act present no easy solutions. On the one
hand, these workers deserve some protection against employer abuses.
On the other hand, their alignment with management arguably justifies
178. See Murphy, supra note 167, at 72-73; see, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community
Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984).
179. See Murphy, supra note 167, at 73-74; see, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (1977).
180. Murphy, supra note 167, at 74; see, e.g., Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693
P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 688 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983).
181. Note, supra note 172, at 1934 (1983).
182. Lopatka, supra note 170, at 2 (citing Steiber, The Case For Protection of Unorganized
Employees Against Unfair Discharge, 32 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N 160-61
(1980)).
183. Steiber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558 (1985).
184. Id. at 563.
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their separation from labor under a conflict of interest theory. Among
the employees either implicitly or explicitly excluded from the coverage
of the Act are managerial, supervisory, confidential, and, under certain
circumstances, professional employees. When one of these employees
falls outside the coverage of the Act, he may have an alternate source of
protection either under a statute, such as the ADEA or Title VII, or in
a judicially created protection, such as the wrongful discharge excep-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
The most fundamental solution to the plight of the hybrid em-
ployee lies in the rethinking of the assumptions underlying labor-man-
agement relations and United States labor laws. If labor-management
relations are still largely adversarial, perhaps the exclusion of manage-
rial and supervisory employees is justified. If, on the other hand, the
adversarial system of labor relations is eroding, there may be no com-
pelling reason to exclude these employees from the protection of the
Act. Such employees presumably could be segregated from the other
employees into their own bargaining units to avoid a potential conflict
of interest.
The possibility that hybrid employees do not actually need or nec-
essarily desire protection from their employers is also worthy of consid-
eration. Managers, supervisors, and professionals may be sophisticated
enough to resolve problems with their employers without resorting to
specialized protective legislation. Further, these employees may not
have as strong a desire for representation by labor organizations as
common employees. To the extent these assumptions are accurate, con-
cern over exclusion of these employees from the National Labor Rela-
tions Act may be unnecessary. If, however, the trend in labor-
management relations indeed is shifting away from antagonism toward
cooperation, efforts should be made to fit the hybrid employee into a
cooperative scheme.
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